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The paper investigates different implications of theoretical models for hierarchical  
structure. A sample of 6567 firms in the Brazilian manufacturing industry is 
considered and explanatory factors pertaining structural characteristics, network 
technology, technological innovations, managerial innovations and Incentive 
mechanisms are investigated. Despite the broader availability of explanatory 
variables in some categories, one only detects important joint effects accruing 
from the group of network technology variables as had been previously obtained in 
the related literature. In contrast, however, one can detect a marginally significant 
joint effect of the newly considered group of incentive mechanisms variables. The 
evidence in terms of individual effects is largely consistent with the predicted 
effects from the theoretical literature on hierarchy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditional microeconomic analysis often considers the firm as a black box 
identified with a production function. The growing complexity of firms operating in 
very dynamic markets renders the investigation of different aspects of the 
organization of firms as especially relevant. 
A central issue with regard to the economics of internal organization of the 
firms [see Hölmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) for 
extensive surveys], refers to the hierarchical design. That structural feature - the 
hierarchy, its levels, the span of control of managers and superiors - conditions, to 
a great extent, the performance of firms. Reflects also the range of job 
opportunities and allocation of workers, as well as the spectrum of wage 
differentials.  More generally, it is a conditioning factor for the implementation of 
different decentralization practices that aim at avoiding coordination failures [see 
e.g. McAfee and McMillan (1998) and Lindbeck and Snower (2000)]. Equally 
important, the shape of the hierarchies evolves and can also be the direct or 
indirect result of strategic choices of organizations [see De Fraja (2004), and 
Yanes, Ng, Tang, Beard, (2005), henceforth YNTB (2005)]. More than a decade 
ago, Radner (1992) proposed that the study of the issues involved in hierarchical 
organization of firms could be categorized according to two main approaches. In 
the decentralization of information strand, the economic literature explores the way 
optimal hierarchies minimize the costs of information processing and 
communication [e.g. Keren and Levhari (1979), Radner, op.cit., Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994)]. The decentralization of incentives approach is based on 
agency and contract theory (especially multi-agent moral hazard models) after the 
pioneering work of Williamson (1967) on hierarchies and loss of control. Other   3
important references related to this rapidly growing literature can be obtained in 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, chapter 8 and part IV).   
  On the other hand, in the empirical literature only a handful of papers have 
emerged in terms of reduced form econometric studies. Delmastro (2002) 
investigated the determinants of management hierarchy taking as reference a 
sample of Italian manufacturing plants. The study considered variables related to 
size, production technology, network technology, managerial innovation, 
ownership status and industry characteristics. The evidence was generally 
consistent with the comparative statics’ signs expected from theory, though those 
implied predictions are not always clear cut. In a related study based on the same 
data source, Colombo and Delmastro (2004), investigated the determinants of the 
delegation of authority. The evidence indicated that the complexity of plants’ 
operations and organizations, the characteristics of communication technologies in 
use, the ownership status and the product mix of the parent companies are 
particularly relevant in explaining the delegation of decision power. 
  In the present paper, we intend to further investigate the scarcely studied 
topic on the explanatory factors affecting the management hierarchy. The study is 
undertaken for industrial firms in Brazil and one can highlight some motivating 
aspects that delineate the contribution of the paper, which are:  (a) The 
consideration of a large developing economy with an industrial sector 
characterized by the co-existence of modern and traditional segments. Indeed, an 
eventual significant role for family-run firms can lead to non-economic departures 
from optimal hierarchical structures in addition to those pertaining state ownership. 
The heterogeneity of the Brazilian industry can provide an interesting environment 
for analysis; (b) The availability of a large and unique data base that allows to   4
further explore the role of modern organizational practices and some forms of 
incentive mechanisms that are likely to reduce the need of worker monitoring; and 
(c) An interval measurement for the number of hierarchical levels that enables the 
consideration of econometric methods for count data instead of the potentially 
limiting ordinal level of measurement previously considered. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses 
conceptual aspects that can clarify the determination of the hierarchical structure 
of a firm. The third section discusses the data and presents the empirical results 
associated with the empirical model. The fourth section brings some final 
comments. 
 
2. Management hierarchy: conceptual aspects 
  As we suggested in the Introduction, despite the growing concern of the 
economics literature with the main object of our study, we are still far away from a 
structural empirical model of hierarchies. Consequently, and taking also into 
consideration the great technical sophistication of the pertinent models, there is a 
need to collect and organize some relevant approaches and predictions that can 
be helpful to the following empirical exercise (Section 3). 
  The starting point of our brief survey will be the seminal paper of Williamson 
(1967), which is extended and carefully examined by Calvo and Wellisz 
(1978,1979), Qian (1994), Martin (1993) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).  One 
of the main purposes of Williamson´s treatment is to examine the relationship 
between the decisions taken by bounded rational managers and firm´s hierarchical 
structure. He (see also Martin op.cit.) takes into consideration a firm with height m 
in terms of the number of layers in the firm, denotes by s the span of control, that   5
refers to the number of employees associated to each supervisor, and by α the 
control loss parameter that does not vary with the layer. Qian, op.cit. assumes that  
α declines down the layers, and the αh  are the object of choices by 
supervisors/employees. Therefore, firm output Y can be specified by Y = θ (αs)
m-1, 
being θ an average productivity parameter, α in the top layer is equal to 1, and  
 s
m-1 denotes the layer of workers where production takes place. Naturally, as 
stressed by that author, the benefit of fewer levels is associated to smaller 
cumulative losses across the hierarchy, and its costs are related to (i) the reduced 
effectiveness of monitoring/supervision as the result of increased span of control, 
and (ii) the higher efficiency wages needed to induce employees to work (see 
below). The results that follow are worked out (with different emphasis) by the 
authors cited above, but at the cost of some simplification we will put them in the 
form of summarizing propositions, that are: 
Proposition 1 (Williamson, Martin): In a competitive setting, with price-taking firms 
the profit maximizing value of m, the number of layers, rises as the profitability in 
relation to wages rise and as the control loss parameter α rises. 
Proposition 2 (Williamson, Martin, Qian): In a competitive setting, the profit 
maximizing value of m raises with s, the number of employees associated to a 
given supervisor. More generally, the number of layers rises with (profitability) and 
scale, given by the number of workers in the lowest layer. 
  At this point some brief comments should be made about the costs incurred 
by the hierarchy. In fact, for Williamson, s does not vary along the levels, nor α, but 
it is not difficult to relax these assumptions to follow recent traditions. Following 
Bolton and Dewatripont, op.cit., we could take s
m-1 to be equal to N, and s indexed 
by the level such that sh would equal the number of employees at  level h + 1   6
divided by the number of employees at  level h. Take φ to be an increasing 
function in effort αh with α in the first level equal to one (the principal does not incur 
in loss of control). With a two layers hierarchy, it can be shown that the efficiency 
wage that would give incentives to employees at the bottom layer not to shirk 
would be equal to w1 =  φ (α1) N. With a three layers hierarchy, w2 =  φ (α2) N/sh , 
which means that a lower wage would be paid to lower levels employees, what is 
in accordance with one of Williamson`s assumptions (see Martin, op.cit.). That is, 
when the principal gets more supervisors, he reduces his span of control, the loss 
of control and the wage per supervisor in the intermediate layers, having however 
to pay more to supervisors to avoid them to shirk. This wage inequality structure is 
a general result that emanates from the body of literature we are examining. 
However, the lack of appropriate information in our data base recommends that 
we go to the next proposition, which follows: 
Proposition 3 (Martin, McAfee and McMillan): In an oligopolistic setting, where firm 
structure is also treated as endogenous, the number of hierarchical layers 
decrease as the number of firms increase. That is, the number of layers would 
increase with concentration. 
This proposition also suggests that a firm with a long hierarchy may not 
survive more competitive pressures in output market. One of the reasons for this 
prediction is that (see McAfee and McMillan, op.cit., for extensions and related 
literature on influence costs) private information in lower levels and the associated 
bargaining power of middle-range managers result in diseconomies of scale 
(“Rents must exist for a long hierarchy to be viable”).   
   In a recent study, YNTB (2005), explored the endogenous determination of 
firm structure. Even in a competitive setting, firms could insert the hierarchy as an   7
argument of the production function. That is, the organization of the hierarchy   
determines output.  Firm inputs are measured in terms of the height of he 
hierarchy (its vertical dimension) and the span of control (in a CES production 
function) assuming that workers at different levels perform different tasks, in such 
a way that an increase in the elasticity of substitution corresponds to a decrease in 
task specialization - decrease in intra-firm specialization - division of labor occurs 
in a lesser extent. In particular, technologically intensive sectors are characterized 
by high intra-firm specialization. The study lead us, among other important results, 
to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1` (YNTB): When tasks are segmented by levels, the firms will expand 
both vertically and horizontally when output price rises. And, 
Proposition 4 (YNTB): When tasks are segmented by levels, the firms tend to 
become less hierarchical as intra-firm specialization declines. More specifically,   
technologically intensive sectors are expected to be more hierarchical than sectors 
where intra-firm specialization is low.  
  Given the heterogeneous nature of our data base (see Introduction), those 
conjectures may be subjected to some qualifications that are, it should be 
stressed, explicitly beyond the scope of YNTB paper. Based on extensive 
empirical literature, Lindbeck and Snower (2000), LS, [see also Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990)] take us to the realm of evolving organizational forms, and to the 
role of multi-task learning on the reorganization of work. In fact, one of their key 
concepts is that of “blurring of occupational boundaries”, which encompasses 
capital deepening and capital widening. When workers are allowed to acquire 
more skills and variety of skills, newer forms of organization tend to promote multi-
task learning, the complementarities among tasks and the decentralization of   8
decision making. Our summary device may be applicable, and an additional 
proposition follows: 
Proposition 5 (LS): Managerial innovations (for example, Total Quality 
Management, Just-in-Time) promote the learning across tasks, and the 
decentralization of decision making where employees perform a wider variety of 
tasks . 
  This proposition is supported by the analysis of Keren and Levhari (1979) 
and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and allow us to qualify the puzzle properly 
stressed by Delmastro (2002), who confronts these points of view with that of 
Lazear (1995), who predicts that reductions in the cost of communication promote 
specialization and hierarchy. Our reconciling reading, based on proposition 4, is 
that declines in communication costs would tend to promote both specialization of 
workers in specific tasks and (when this is the case) the reliance on large 
hierarchies. However, we think that the point deserves a particular proposition, 
that follows: 
Proposition 6 (Delmastro): Advances in intra-firm communication increase the 
likelihood of a plant choosing a multi-layered structure, and improvements in inter-
firm communication decrease this probability. 
 Following    Lindbeck and Snower, op.cit., Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1994),  
McAfee and McMillan, op.cit., and Delmastro (2002), we will now make explicit our 
final proposition, that gives a link to previous comments.  
Proposition 7 (LS): The introduction of computerized information and 
communications systems is associated to the decentralization of decision making, 
to team work, job rotation and multitasking, leading supervision to be more closely   9
tied to ex-post performance. In particular, corporate reorganizations pushed by 
competitive pressures make pay to be more closely related to performance.  
Altogether, the results just summarized enable to have a better notion on 
the possible expected signs of the coefficients of the reduced form model 
considered in section 3.2. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1-  Data construction 
 
  The present study relied on a comprehensive survey carried out by Fundação 
SEADE for industrial firms in the state of São Paulo [Pesquisa da Atividade 
Econômica Paulista-PAEP] in 1996. This survey comprised some basic 
accounting data, but more importantly detailed data on technology and 
organizational practices. The final sample after verifying for omissions has 6567 
observations. Next, we describe the variables considered in this study, classified 
by large categories:
1 
. HIE: number of hierarchical levels in the firm; 
 
Structural characteristics 
. SIZE: total number of employees; 
. CONC: industrial concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index at the 4-
digits level (HH = ∑i i s
2 , where si stands for the market share of the i-th firm in  a 
given sector), 
                                            
1  Unlike Delmastro (2002), we did not have access to information on ownership status. 
Nevertheless in the year of 1996 the only Brazilian industrial sector with important state 
participation in production was oil refining that was excluded from our sample.   10
 
Managerial innovations 
. TQM: assumes value 1 if the firm adopts total quality management, and 0 
otherwise; 
. JIT:  assumes value 1 if the firm either adopts internal just-in-time or external 
just-in-time, and 0 otherwise; 
. KAIZEN: assumes value 1 if the firm adopts improvement groups practices, and 
0 otherwise. Those practices had been defined as a new production philosophy 
integrated to TQM programs and is based in the introduction of continuous and 
permanent improvements in the production processes; 
. SCP:  assumes value 1 if the firm adopts statistical control of processes, and 0 
otherwise. It is believed that SCPs preceded the adoption of TQM in Brazilian 
firms (see below). 
Technological innovation 
. INOV: assumes value 1 if the firm made significant or incremental innovations in 
processes and/or in products between 1994-1996; 
.  R&D: number of employees allocated to R&D activities divided by the total 
number of employees; 
.  IM: import intensity defined by imports divided by apparent consumption, as 
provided at the 3-digits level [source: Moreira (1999)]. In fact, capital goods 
imports after Brazilian trade liberalization is reputed to have important 
modernization effects in different industrial sectors.  
Network technology 
. MICRO: number of microcomputer per employee; 
. INTER: assumes value 1 if the firm has access to the Internet and 0 otherwise;   11
. INTRA: assumes value 1 if the firm has access to local exchange networks (e.g. 
LAN networks) and 0 otherwise; 
 
Incentive mechanisms 
. PSHAR: assumes value 1 if there exists a profit sharing mechanisms for 
employees and 0 otherwise; 
. TRAIN: assumes value 1 when the firm offered courses in managing techniques,  
total quality control methods and in languages to blue collar workers. 
The summary statistics of the different variables are presented in table 1 
and indicate  a significant degree of heterogeneity in the sample. 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
3.2- Empirical results 
  The main results from the econometric estimates are presented in tables 2.  
For completeness, we also present the results related to the ordinary least 
squares estimation, though the discrete nature of the dependent variable is better 
approached by means of count data models. Moreover, unlike previous evidence 
that had to rely on data with ordinal features, we can fully take advantage of count 
data models in the present study. 
2  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
The most traditional model in the context of count data is the Poisson 
model, where the (conditional) probability mass function of y given x is provided 
by: 
                                            
2  Cameron and Trivedi (1998) provide a comprehensive overview of econometric methods for 
count data models. Wooldridge (2002, 2003) are also important references.   12
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Further, as usual, one considers a link to explanatory variables as given by 
β µ
' ) ln( i i x = , where x is the vector of characteristics and β the vector of parameters.  
However, that model embodies the potentially limiting assumption of the mean 
being equal to the variance, that is, var( / ) ( / ) yx Eyx = =  µI = exp( β
'
i x ), an 
assumption that is often violated in applied works. In that sense, the estimation of 
the Poisson model is a possibly preliminary step in the analysis as the 
consideration of an overdispersion test is warranted. A possible test is advanced 
by Cameron and Trivedi (1998, p. 78, eq. 3.39). The test requires the estimation of 
the Poisson model to generate fitted values [ ) ˆ exp( ˆ
'β µ i i x = ]  to be used in the 
auxiliary ordinary least squares regression of the form:  














where ui   is the error term. The t statistic corresponding to the α coefficient 
possesses an asymptotically normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no 
overdispersion. In the present application, the evidence clearly favors the rejection 
of the null hypothesis and therefore the plausibility of the Poisson model. In fact, 
the corresponding statistic was 724.74 [with p-value = 0.000].  
Given that result, we could go on and use Poisson Quasi Maximum 
Likelihood estimation, PQMLE, not assuming that the Poisson distribution is 
correct in its entirety [see Wooldridge (2002, 2003), chapters 19 and 17, 
respectively]. This is a procedure that recommends adjustments in the standard 
errors when Var (y|x) = σ
2 E (y|x) is assumed. Instead, we proceed with the   13
estimation of a negative binomial model – NB, that essentially implies the inclusion 
of an individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean [see e.g. Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998), chaps. 2 and 3]
 3 . The NB distribution will constitute our 
preferred specification and indeed it is reputed to have good robustness properties 
against misspecification in the case of overdispersion. In this case, model NB II of 
Cameron and Trivedi, op.cit.. guarantees that two moment conditions will hold, as 
follows: 
var( / ) ( / ) yx Eyx ==  µI  and 
2
i i i w αµ µ + =                      (3) 
The parameters µ and β can be jointly estimated. When µ is estimated in a 
first-stage, as we did, β can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
for all observations, with respect to β. The resulting Quasi Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator – QMLE [that Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984), and Cameron 
and Trivedi, op.cit., p.33, call quasigeneralized peudomaximum likelihood] 
guarantees that the estimator for β is fully efficient [see Cameron and Trivedi, 
op.cit., p.73) and the important result that the first-stage estimation of µ can be 
ignored [see Wooldridge (2000), pp. 355, 658-659] given only the conditional 
mean assumption.  
Before proceeding with the description of the results it is important to 
emphasize that the conditional mean of the negative binomial is the same as the 
Poisson model whereas the conditional variance differs across those models. 













, which are considered for our preferred specification with 
                                            
3  The alternative hypothesis of that overdispersion test considers the alternative in terms of 
negative binomial model (NB2) model of Cameron and Trivedi with variance function given by 
2
i i i w αµ µ + = . All estimations were undertaken with the software Eviews 5.0.   14
explanatory variables at the mean sample values so as obtain a better perspective 
on the magnitude of the effects.  
  It is interesting to observe that for different significant coefficients the 
magnitude and signs were remarkably similar in the two specifications. 
Exceptions, however, occur for some organizational practices’ variables. From a 
more specific statistical point of view the results are appealing. There is a good 
overall fit as indicated by the coefficient of determination and a broad range of 
significant coefficients with meaningful signs. Therefore, we think that those with 
more meaningful coefficients should be associated to our propositions.  
  Propositions 1/1` constitute general references that cannot be directly 
highlighted by the results, but that is not the case with respect to Propositions 2 
and 3. In fact, the number of hierarchical levels increases with size, though no 
significant effect for concentration is detected, what gives a partial and indirect 
support to the initial propositions. Note, however, that the marginal effect of SIZE 
is very small.  
Proposition 4 deserves a special attention, as it suggests that technology 
intensive sectors tend to become more hierarchical. In the present study its 
empirical counterpart lies in the coefficients of IM, INOV and R&D. The INOV 
indicator has very low marginal effect and indicates a negative effect on the 
number of hierarchical levels of Brazilian firms, but that is not the case when IM 
and R&D are considered. In both cases the positive coefficient is significant, and 
the marginal effect of R&D reached 7.220.   
Proposition 6 is strongly supported by the results related to MICRO, INTER 
and INTRA, as far as the signs of the coefficients are concerned. They all indicate 
(with highly significant coefficients) that the introduction of micro-computers and   15
inter-firm communications systems contribute to the decrease of hierarchical 
levels, but that the introduction of intra-firm communications systems tends to lead 
to more hierarchy,  where the marginal effect of INTRA reaches the expressive 
value of 2.300.  
A partial  compatibility occurs between proposition 5 and our managerial 
innovations variables. The coefficient of the variable TQM appears with the 
expected sign, but with no significant effect detected. It is worth mentioning the 
significant negative effects emerging from SCP and KAIZEN that would be 
consistent with the reasoning by LS. In the case of JIT (a variable that includes 
internal as well as external just-in-time), however, one obtains a positive and 
significant coefficient
4. Among these variables, it should be emphasized, SCP 
revealed the most expressive marginal effect. 
Finally, TRAIN, that we take as an indicator of incentive mechanism and of 
multi-tasking improvements, and our indicator of profit sharing with employees, 
PSHA, exhibit expected signs in the light of proposition 7, and their marginal 
effects are also non-negligible and indicate the expected negative effect on the 
number of hierarchical levels. 
Despite individual significant effects, it is important to have a sharper 
portrayal of the hierarchical structure by considering the impact of selected 
categories of explanatory factors. For that purpose, we consider likelihood ratio 
type tests for different groups that are partially similar to those considered by 
Delmastro (2002) and are reported in table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
                                            
4 Professor David Kupfer pointed up to us that it is a well known fact that at the date our information  
was collected the Brazilian industry was just introducing Total Quality Methods, and that the 
statistical control methods preceded the more broadly adoption of TQM.    16
First, we consider a group of structural variables (comprising both firm and 
sectoral level data). Unlike the aforementioned author, this group included a firm-
level structural variable as given by the firm size and concentration. The evidence 
indicated that as a group the referred variables play no significant role. 
   The group referring to technological innovation comprised variables that can 
be seen as an input to the innovative activity (R&D) or an output of the process 
(INOV). The joint effects of those variables are statistically negligible. Analogous 
results were previously obtained in the context of production technology variables 
related to production flexibility and the degree of automation.   
   In the group of managerial innovations, we considered not only more 
traditional practices like total quality management (TQM) and just-in-time (JIT) but 
also improvement groups (KAIZEN) and statistical control of processes (SCP). 
Nevertheless, the previous evidence seems to prevail: there are no relevant 
effects of modern organization practices as a group in explaining hierarchical 
structure. 
  In the group of network technology, we include in addition to the Internet 
(INTER) and Intranet (INTRA) access variables previously considered in the 
literature, a variable indicating the availability of microcomputers relative to the 
number of employees (MICRO). In fact, the actual utilization of the network 
presupposes an adequate access to IT equipments. In this case the evidence is 
very strong in the sense of indicating a strong joint effect of those variables in 
explaining hierarchical structure and once more is consistent with the previous 
evidence. 
   An additional category included in this study refers to incentive mechanisms 
that can mitigate the need for closer monitoring. In that category, we included a   17
more indirect element as given by training to personnel not related to production 
(TRAIN) and a direct factor referring to the prevalence of profit sharing with 
employees (PSHA). The evidence with that respect is partially encouraging, as 
those variables are marginally significant as a group.   18
4. Final  comments 
The paper undertook an econometric investigation on the determinants of the 
hierarchical structure in Brazilian manufacturing industry in 1996. In broad terms 
one can highlight categories of explanatory factors relating to structural 
characteristics, network technology, technological innovations, managerial 
innovations and Incentive mechanisms. Among those, one only detects strong 
joint effects accruing from network technology variables as was the case in the 
previous literature. When we take these variables individually, a strong tendency 
to more hierarchical levels is detected, together with some consistent indications 
of decentralization.  In fact, a marginally significant joint effect is associated with 
the group of newly considered incentive mechanisms variables. Taken individually, 
these last variables point in the direction of more decentralized structures in 
Brazilian industry firms. 
As a whole, the analysis of the effects associated with individual variables 
was largely consistent with theoretical predictions from the hierarchy literature. 
Nevertheless, different routes for future research appear to be relevant. First, the 
reduced form character of the analysis should be followed at some stage by 
structural econometric investigations that are yet absent in this particular context. 
In particular, the data used in the present study was not updated. Second, the 
assessment of complementarities among the different organizational practices and 
incentive schemes is a topic of related interest that is in the front line of the 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics (No. of observations: 6567) 
Variables Minimum  Maximum Mean  Std.  deviation
HIE  2.00 10.00 3.46  1.61 
SIZE  2.00 20159.00  166.84 637.96 
CONC  0.00 1.00 0.16 0.17 
IM  0.00 0.82 0.19 0.24 
INOV  0.00 1.00 0.81 0.39 
R&D  0.00 0.23  1.59E-03  0.01 
MICRO  0.00 2.50 0.11 0.14 
INTRA  0.00 1.00 0.45 0.50 
INTER  0.00 1.00 0.87 0.33 
TQM  0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
JIT  0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 
KAIZEN  0.00 1.00 0.82 0.39 
SCP  0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 
PSHA  0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46 









   23
Table 2: Determinants of Hierarchical Structure – Econometric Estimates (No. of 
observations: 6567) 
 




Negative binomial model 
Constant 2.865 






SIZE 1.08E-04   
(0.000)   







(0.778)       





IM 0.402   
(0.000)   






(0.052)       
-0.0232 





(0.003)   
1.819 





(0.000)       












INTER  -0.071       
(0.015) 
-0.0310 





(0.050)       
-0.018     





(0.137)       
0.0191 





(0.103)       
-0.022 





(0.000)       
-0.060  





(0.000)       
-0.041   





(0.000)       
-0.079     




        
Adjusted R
2 0.534  0.543  0.540 
Log likelihood  -9919.86 -10833  -15297.56 
 
 
Note: p-vales are indicated in parentheses where the related standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity; Poisson model was estimated by maximum likelihood, Negative Binomial model 
was estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood with the last column in the right presenting the 
marginal effects (that can be compared to the OLS coefficients).   24
Table 3: Determinants of hierarchy-joint significance tests for selected categories 
of explanatory variables 
 
Group of variables  Test statistic  p-value 
Technological innovations     
R&D, INOV, IM  χ
2(2) = 5.501  0.139 
Managerial innovations     
TQM, JIT, KAI, SCP  χ
2(4) = 4.394  0.355 
Network technology     
INTRA, INTER, MICRO  χ
2(3) =  515.151  0.000 
Incentive mechanisms     
PSHA, TRAIN  χ
2(2) = 5.668  0.0587 
Structural characteristics     
SIZE, CONC  χ
2(3) = 1.224  0.542 
 
 